ABSTRACT From the perspective of most animal scientists and producers, animal agriculture has become increasingly contentious over the last 10 to 20 years. Furthermore, our critics seem to be extremists whose views are biased and unreasonable. But guess what? The critics say the same thing about animal producers and scientists (us). So where is the middle ground and how do we get there? Should we even worry about trying to define the middle ground? Are these contentious issues a fad that will go away? Are these "extremist" critics so far outside reason that they will be ignored by society? Ignoring "them" is not likely to work because we have seen society changing its mind (developing a new social ethic) with
INTRODUCTION
In the last 2 decades of the 20th century, animal agriculture came under fire from several fronts including philosophers and animal welfare critics. The most strident of the philosophical critics included Peter Singer (1975 Singer ( revised in 1990 ) who wrote about animal liberation and Tom Regan (1983) who wrote about animal rights. Several additional philosophers have continued discussing these issues (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992; Gaard, 1993; Taylor, 1999; Francione, 2000; Rowlands, 2002) . In the 1970s and even into the 1980s, we (animal scientists and animal producers) thought (naively, as it turns out) that these extremists were so far out of touch with reality that few people would take them seriously. Wrong! Now we (here and throughout "we" and "us" refer to animal scientists and producers) find that social pressure is mounting concerning animal rights/liberation and resulting in a growing population of vegetarians and vegans. Scully (2002) said that there are now over 17 million vegetarians in the U.S. A number of those who have adopted a vegetarian lifestyle cite moral concerns about how food animals are treated in modern production systems as a reason for their dietary choices (Cheeke, 1999) . To whom correspondence should be addressed: steven.l.davis@ orst.edu.
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regard to farm animals, in part because of what these critics are saying. As a result, it is vitally important for us to know and understand what is happening and why. For example, there isn't just one voice among the critics. There is actually a spectrum of opinion among the group which conventional agriculturalists usually call their critics. The WCC-204 committee generally agrees that the key to finding the middle ground between what is perceived as a polarized set of issues between "us" (animal scientists and producers) and "them" (philosopher critics) is for both sides to learn about the reasons why each side says what they do. Only then can all parties rationally begin to identify where the middle ground lies.
What do we do about these critics? Is there a middle ground between their position and ours? If so, how can that middle ground be defined, and by whom should it be defined? Like it or not, it is being defined for us, so what are we to do? In this paper, our objective is to give an overview of how the middle ground is being defined, how that is shaping a new social ethic (Rollin, 1995) about animals, and how animal producers and scientists must participate in the discussion and debate.
The Spectrum of Opinion
We believe that to many, if not most, animal scientists and producers, the rights/liberation theories of philosophers seem to be extreme. So we think of "them" as extremists for whom there is no middle ground and they, likewise, see "us" as extremists who aren't interested in defining the middle ground. In fact, there is actually a spectrum of opinion with the pro-animal rights/liberationists at one end and the animal dominionists (those who staunchly believe that God gave man dominion over the animals) at the other (NAIA, 2003) . Those looking at the issue of animals from either end of the spectrum would probably see the middle ground to be closer to their own position.
From the title of this paper, one might get the impression that all philosophers are of one mind at the end of the opinion spectrum. Obviously, they are not. Fraser (1999) divided them into 2 groups, which he called "Type 1" and "Type 2." Type 1 philosophers, he said, have worked in isolation, using language and methods that aren't compatible with animal welfare scientists. On the other hand, the work of Type 2 philosophers "tends to build bridges, or at least send up flares that are visible from the scientists' side of the abyss" (Fraser, 1999) . Seemingly, the Type I philosophers take the more extreme positions and are more interested in the ideology of animal rights/liberation than in finding a middle ground, while Type 2 philosophers are more willing to become involved in a dialogue about animal issues. In a very pragmatic sense, however, we believe that even the strongest of the idealists who advocate for the rights/ liberation view in the long term are willing to say, "in the meantime, when using animals, we should do so in ways that show them respect and allow them the ability to express their natural behaviors and live free of suffering." This position is reminiscent of that which describes animal welfarists, who are often perceived to represent the middle ground between extreme animal rights proponents and dominionists.
Fraser (1999) also suggested that animal welfare scientists and animal liberation philosophers, until quite recently, intentionally ignored one another's work. He said that while the work of Regan (1983) and Singer (1990) "did a great deal to generate and articulate public concern over animals...many animal welfare scientists tended either to ignore these works, or they took pains to distance their own work from the ideas of these ethicists." Similarly, the philosophers ignored the work of animal welfare scientists. "The resulting lack of communication prevented both groups from achieving their common goal."
And What Do We Do To Define Middle Ground? Thompson (1999) said "controversial issues" about animal agriculture "testify to the need for a new or revitalized professional ethic for livestock producers, the meat and dairy industry, and, in particular, animal scientists." What did he mean by new professional ethic and how do we develop one? He said that a professional ethic must include both statements of a code of conduct and statements of an ethical code pertaining to professional responsibilities for the profession as a whole. Several things need to be done to accomplish that:
1. Establish statements of a professional ethic by the professional societies such as the American Society of Animal Science, the Poultry Science Association, and the American Dairy Science Association. 2. Create a Regional Project on bioethics within the Agricultural Experiment Station System. That objective has been accomplished as described in the companion paper in this symposium by Cherney (2003) and by Davis et al. (2000) . 3. Create research, teaching, and extension programs that encourage increased understanding of ethics, and that encourage collaboration among agriculture, philosophy, sociology, etc. One example is the WCC-204 project described in the companion paper by Cherney (2003) . 4. Create undergraduate courses in fields such as animal welfare, animal behavior, and animal ethics in our curricula. An example is the "Ethical Issues in Animal Agriculture" course at Oregon State University (Davis and Swanson, 1999) and the "Ethics and Animal Science" course at Cornell University (Cherney, 2003). 5. Establish extension programs that allow discussion of societal concerns about animal welfare. 6. Hire new animal science faculty who have interest and training in bioethics. Rollin (1995) said that a new social ethic has developed in the U.S. which demands that farm animals be produced in systems that allow them to express their natural behaviors. The previously listed steps are critical in designing, evaluating, and, ultimately, implementing the types of systems Rollin advocated.
Consistent with these ideas are the words of Hodges (2003) who said that we "need to embrace a new vision beyond the single-minded existing pursuit of biological efficiency" and focus additionally on "animal welfare, sustainable farming, environment and natural resources." In other words, we need to broaden our horizons and include values in addition to production efficiency in defining the new professional ethic.
Fraser (1999) also supported the notion of science/ philosophic collaboration and said that the "increasing convergence of the scientific and philosophical approaches may lead to a more integrated field of study and to a greater awareness that neither empirical information nor ethical reflection can, by itself, answer questions about our proper relationship to animals of other species." Let us emphasize the words "greater awareness." One could interpret that to mean a greater understanding of each other's position. With increased understanding comes true movement toward the middle, or "the middle ground."
The metaphor of a spectrum of opinion describes a situation where liberationist philosophies are at one end and dominionists are at the other. These groups are so far apart that neither can accurately see the middle that divides them. On the other hand, there are animal ethicists who speak a language that seems to bring animal scientists toward a movement to the middle. These include Rollin (1993 Rollin ( , 1995 and Thompson (1999) . Rollin (1993) , in fact, could be considered by some to be an animal rights advocate. However, the rights he claimed for animals are quite different from those of Regan (1983) who claimed that animals have noninterference rights, or the right to live their lives without interference from humans. Rollin (1995) , however, suggested that it is all right to use animals in food production so long as we allow the animals to express their natural (genetically developed) behaviors or what he calls "telos." Thus he argued for a return to a type of animal agriculture that promotes the expression of telos rather than abolition of animal agriculture. He suggested that a new social ethic has developed in Europe and is emerging in the U.S. about the use of animals in food production. This new social ethic is one that places more concern on how well the animals are being treated in production systems, in transport, and in slaughter. (Rollin, 1995) . 3. The increased demand for vegetarian and vegan alternative foods, as evidenced by the numbers of these products that are increasingly available everywhere, from supermarket shelves to fast food restaurants. 4. The passage of the 1988 Swedish animal welfare law that was intended to get animals out of confinement systems over 10 years (Rollin, 1995) . 5. The European Union's 1999 directive to ban cage and small pen production systems (Duncan, 2001 ). Duncan (2001) said that with regard to animal welfare, the U.S. generally lags about 10 years behind the Europeans. This seems to be playing itself out as more information is published on the issue in the U.S. and the social outcry for improved welfare standards continues.
Indeed, the recent food animal welfare initiatives begun by the fast food industry may herald the genesis of a new version of animal agriculture, similar to that envisioned by Hodges (2003) and motivated by the new social ethic described by Rollin (1995) . These efforts are providing an unprecedented impetus for reform of modern food animal production methods in the absence of legislation mandating change. Schweikhardt and Browne (2001) referred to similar efforts as "the arrival of politics by other means." They suggested that if food companies believe that their consumers value some particular aspect of its product (for instance, animal-friendly rearing conditions), then it is possible to have policy advocates influence enough of the market to establish regulations pertaining to that aspect. These would then be imposed not by law, but by the policies of those companies who want to maintain a competitive edge (Schweikhardt and Browne, 2001) . They also suggested that, in contemporary markets, the growing trend is for food companies to find new factors that may give them that competitive advantage. Animal welfare may well be that distinguishing characteristic for a rapidly growing segment of the food industry in the U.S. In the late 1990s to early 2000s, with the guidance of animal welfare scientists, the McDonald's corporation set forth animal welfare guidelines for its producers of animal products. Similar guidelines were soon adopted by McDonald's competitor, Burger King, and, later, by other fast food chains. By 2003, the National Council of Chain Restaurants and the Food Marketing Institute, which represent over 26,000 food retail stores and over 120,000 restaurants, franchises and cooperators, respectively, followed suit, drafting a program to develop and support industry efforts at improving food animal welfare (NCCR, 2003) . It is unlikely that these efforts could have succeeded in the absence of a social ethic in which some level of moral consideration is extended to animals, including those used for food. Here then we begin to find compelling evidence of Rollin's premise of a new social ethic regarding farm animals. Furthermore, it is important to note that animal scientists have participated in these efforts and by doing so have helped to define the middle ground.
The outcry for improved animal welfare standards has recently been described by a political conservative. In his recent book, Scully (2002) , a former speech writer for President G. W. Bush, called for the passage of a new "humane farming act." This proposed new act would, among other things: "prohibit waste products from being used in animal feed...; define other proper living conditions appropriate to each species..., prohibit tail docking, ear notching, de-horning, de-beaking, hot iron branding, unanesthetized castration...; ban the use of hormones, genetic engineering technologies...; restrict the pace and method of slaughter...; hold veterinarians to the sworn oath of their profession...; ensure that agricultural employees are appropriately trained...; require of all agricultural trade partners comparable standards of animal husbandry...; impose upon violators...heavy fines and criminal penalties." Scully said, "If we cannot do something humanely without degrading both the animals and ourselves, then we shouldn't do it at all." The late biologist Stephen Jay Gould (2003) said that the sciences and the humanities (philosophers, sociologists, artists, etc.) have been at odds for centuries. The way he described this difference of view is that they represent different ways of "knowing" or understanding. In the course we teach in "Ethical Issues in Animal Agriculture" (Davis and Swanson, 1999) , we suggest that it is important to include both world views, or ways of knowing, when describing our relationship to animals. To do otherwise describes an incomplete picture. In fact, Gould (2003) suggested that, in the broader context of the sciences and humanities, this co-mingling of ideas and discourse is already also happening. It is in this spirit that we suggest that defining the real middle ground requires a collaboration between "them" (humanities) and "us" (scientists and producers.)
CONCLUSIONS
The middle ground in the debate about animals is being defined as we speak. It is important for us, therefore, to be knowledgeable about who is involved in preparing this definition, how they are doing it, and why. Even more importantly, we must become credible participants in this process. To do that requires that we acknowledge the philosophers around us and develop philosophers among us.
